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Abstract
The Cuban-American lobby successfully influenced Congress and various presidential administrations from
the early 1980s until nearly the end of the century on U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Although two major
events, the passage of the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, and the Elián
González affair of the same year, dramatically reduced the power of this conservative ethnic interest group, its
influence continued during the George W. Bush presidency. Despite the lobby’s active role, since 2008 the
opposition of several political actors towards the sanctions regime, such as the agribusiness lobby, the
administration of Barack Obama, and a significant number of Congressmen from both major parties, created
an environment of major competition between two camps with distinct policy agendas. With the focus on the
parallelism between the economic reforms on the island, and the changing American interest group politics,
this paper seeks to study the determinants of the embargoes continuity in the 21st century, and the conditions
that shape the new policy announced by the Obama administration in late 2014.
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Introduction 
 
Although the USSR no longer exists and Cuban socialism no longer poses a 
threat to the world from a Western perspective, the embargo has continued 
through the various U.S. administrations—Democratic and Republican—until 
today. The U.S. has normalized its relations with several countries, such as 
China and Vietnam, but Cuba has ended up being forgotten in the attention of 
the United States. The ‘thaw’ in Cuba-U.S. relations began only in December 
2014, reaching its peak in July and August 2015 with the opening of 
embassies in Havana and Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, the future of 
relations between the two countries remains uncertain. 
Washington has shown no serious sign of a desire to change the 
situation until December 2014 despite the instrumentalization of the U.S. 
sanctions by the Cuban government to justify the weak points of its economy 
and despite the opposition of different sectors among American society like 
several members of the U.S. Congress—not only a large share of the 
Democrats, but also a small part of the Republican party—as well as important 
sectors of the business community, academics, moderate Cuban-Americans, 
and humanitarian and religious groups. 
The main reason for this unproductive policy was the role played by 
the powerful anti-Castro Cuban-American lobby, which is constituted of 
Cuban exiles and immigrants settled mainly in Miami since the early years of 
the Revolution, and which opposed any attempt to normalize relations. Its 
strength became apparent in the formulation of the U.S. foreign policy towards 
Cuba in the 1980s, with the efforts of their exemplary organization, the Cuban 
American National Foundation (CANF). Nevertheless, the loss of power of 
this organization in the late 20th century, the agribusiness lobby’s entry into 
the scene with its allies in Congress, and the arrival of a President sympathetic 
to the cause of the normalization of the relations between the two countries in 
2009 resulted in a change in the direction of U.S. policy towards the island. 
With the focus on the parallelism between the economic reforms on the island 
and the changing American interest group politics, this paper seeks to study 
the determinants of continuity of the embargo in the 21st century and the 
conditions that shape the new policy announced by the Barack Obama 
administration in late 2014. 
 
The Evolution of the Cuban-American Lobby 
 
Unlike most other countries, the U.S. legislature plays an essential role in the 
foreign policy decision-making process. This—combined with the strength of 
civil society in the United States—results in the active participation of various 
interest groups in legislative discussions. Owing to the high socioeconomic 
status of its components and their organizational skills, the Cuban-American 
community weighs in on the political processes related to their country of 
origin, despite the community members’ limited demographic strengths when 
compared to the Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants settled in the United 
States. 
The entry of the Cuban ‘exiles’ onto the American political scene took 
place in the early 1960s, with the first wave of migration that followed the 
Cuban revolution. These early immigrants were those who were more 
committed to the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, such as the officials and 
members of bourgeois families. A second wave, called the Camarioca exodus 
in 1965, included the rest of the bourgeoisie and the middle class frightened by 
the revolutionary radicalism of the new Cuban government (Alfonso, 2012: 
73). 
Over these first two flows, Washington D.C. knew how to use the 
migration issue as an instrument of pressure and destabilization vis-à-vis the 
young revolution. Although migration persisted in the 1970s, the prosperity of 
the Cuban economy prevented an exodus during that decade. However, the 
Mariel boatlift changed the direction of that trend in 1980. In this flow, 
125,000 Cubans from different professional backgrounds left the island, 
seeking to reach the Florida coast mainly due to economic reasons. As a 
consequence, the 1980 exodus resulted in the integration of a new generation 
that spent much of its life under the revolutionary discourse of the Cuban-
American community and meant the beginning of the community’s 
transformation in its relations with the island (Bobes, 2012). The last 
migratory crisis occurred in 1994, with the departure of thousands of Cubans 
from the island. The number of migrants, however, started to increase again 
after the Raul Castro government lifted travel restrictions in 2013.1 All these 
new migrants contributed to the transformation of the community, which 
would later help moderates and agribusiness groups to affect the legislative 
and executive branches in order to soften the sanctions without fearing an 
electoral defeat in Florida.  
The institutionalization of the contact between the community and the 
administration, however, became possible only with the creation of the CANF 
in 1981 by Jorge Mas Canosa during the administration of Ronald Reagan. 
Meanwhile, the election of a President to the White House who was 
determined to destroy the Socialist bloc—of which Cuba was part—was the 
beginning of a new era for the Cuban ‘exiles.’ After becoming an active and 
effective lobby in the 1980s, more and more members of the community were 
elected first at the local and then at the national levels. The creation of the 
CANF by the businessman Jorge Mas Canosa in 1981 was a major step in this 
process. Inspired by that famous organization, the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the CANF has quickly become an influential 
interest group, thanks to its wealthy members. Unlike the traditional lobbies of 
other ethnic groups, the Cuban-American lobby was not seeking to defend the 
                                                        
1 See Pew Research Center website for the number of Cubans entering the U.S. from 2005 to 
2015: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/10/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-
relations-warm/ 
interests of the government of their country of origin, but was aiming to 
overthrow it. With the efforts of this organization, two principal anti-
communist propaganda tools—Radio Marti and TV Marti—were founded, 
respectively in 1983 and in 1990, by the Washington, D.C. administration. The 
election of several members of the community to the U.S. Congress followed 
this activism, including the election of Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, in 
1989, to the House of Representatives as the first Cuban-American legislator 
at the national level. 
Through a Political Action Committee—Free Cuba PAC—CANF’s 
leaders distributed hundreds of thousands of dollars among the campaigns of 
several candidates from both parties in the last decade of the century.2 Despite 
their limited population compared to the total population of the United States, 
this conservative community became the second strongest ethnic group—
following the Israeli lobby—when the funds spent were considered.  
The CANF lobbied successfully to pass two laws that strengthened the 
embargo against the island, the first by the Torricelli Act in 1992, and then by 
the Helms-Burton Act in 1996. The law of 1992 can be named the most 
important success of the CANF, whereas the role of the organization was 
much less during the entry of the 1996 Act into force. Until February 1996, 
President Clinton had opposed the Helms-Burton Act, arguing that the law 
contradicted international law, and that it would harm the relations of the 
country with its main allies because of the proposal’s extraterritorial clauses. 
Only in February 1996, when Cuban fighter planes shot down two small 
civilian aircraft of the Cuban-American organization Hermanos al Resgate, 
which were scattering anti-government propaganda flyers on the island, the 
Cuban-American community was mobilized and the island attracted the 
attention of public opinion, forcing President Clinton to change his position 
and tighten the sanctions against Havana (LeoGrande, 1998:80-1). 
Over the decades, Cuban-Americans who have obtained U.S. 
citizenship constituted a bloc of voters in Florida and New Jersey in favour of 
the Republican Party. For instance, in 1992, only 18% of Cuban-American 
voters voted for Bill Clinton in Florida, in spite of the hardliner position of this 
candidate against the Castro government. Unlike their loyalty to Republicans 
that lasted until Obama's election in 2009, Cuban-Americans have contributed 
more money to the campaigns of the Democratic candidates than to those of 
the Republicans because of the connection between the Democratic Party and 
the two big families of Cuban origin, Road and Ceja (Vagnoux, 2007: 193). In 
this way, the lobby was able to influence many Democratic representatives 
and Senators in the direction of its own agenda—against the leadership of 
Fidel Castro. 
One of the most notable cases was the Democratic representative from 
New Jersey, Robert Torricelli. He was a liberal on many political issues, 
                                                        
2 See Center for Responsive Politics website for the details of Free Cuba PAC’s spendings: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?cycle=2000&strID=C00142117 
including the issue of the embargo at the beginning of his political career. 
However, being aware of the growing number of Cuban voters in New Jersey, 
he approached the CANF and its leader, Mas Canosa, who later began to 
finance his election campaigns (LeoGrande 1998: 74). Torricelli thus became 
the sponsor of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, which would strengthen the 
embargo against the island whose economic situation had already become 
perilous because of the dissolution of the USSR and the Socialist bloc. 
Vagnoux (2007: 195) points out that in the late 1990s, it was no longer 
possible to speak of an alliance between Washington and CANF, but ‘a 
relationship of interest, sometimes a little forced.’ The power of the lobby in 
Miami started to be reduced during this period in favour of the interests of 
agricultural and commercial groups, with the efforts of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and U.S. Chamber of Commerce-related organizations, 
which supported the lifting of the sanctions against the island in order to 
develop trade between the two nations. 
In this direction, Cuba benefited from some trade concessions, such as 
the suspension of the application of extraterritorial provisions (Title III) of the 
Helms-Burton Act3 for six months and the renewal since then of this 
suspension by all presidents in office. Clinton also used his prerogatives to 
delimit the efforts of members of Congress whose position was close to the 
Cuban-American lobby. The passage of The Trade Sanction Reform and 
Export Enhancement Act (TSRA)4 of 2000 in his last year in office can be 
considered the first major victory of the anti-embargo groups. 
Despite the strengthening of the lobby during the two terms of George 
W. Bush, it should be underlined that the power of the conservative lobby had 
already been considerably reduced by two major events before the arrival of 
Bush in the White House. The first was the death of the founder of the CANF, 
Jorge Mas Canosa, in 1997, which generated divisions within the community. 
Then the case of Elián González exposed the differences of opinion and 
interests between the Cuban-American community and the rest of American 
society. Elián's return to his country at the end of the June 2000 was a major 
defeat for CANF, which had fought to keep the boy in the U.S., against the 
opinion of the majority of the American public, which refused to separate the 
child from his father (Egozcue 2008: 62). These two events not only damaged 
the reputation of the CANF and the community, but also caused a sharp divide 
within Cuban-Americans, opening up a political space to the more moderate 
and liberal wings of the community. It was in this context that the TSRA of 
2000 was passed, which authorized the exportations of some agricultural and 
medical products from the U.S. to Cuba, despite the (unsuccessful) opposition 
of the already weakened CANF. This new panorama that appeared at the turn 
of the century, and the conflict between the Cuban-American lobby and 
                                                        
3 See the full text of the Helms-Burton Act: 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr927/text 
4 See the full text of the TSRA: 
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter79&edition=prelim 
recently developed interest groups will be analysed in the next section in light 
of the existing literature on interest group politics. 
 
Interest Groups in American Politics 
 
Interest groups are categorized as those that are based on affiliation and those 
that are institutional. Both have advantages and disadvantages. The 
organizations which have a social base include ethnic interest groups that 
instrumentalize the votes of its members or followers to influence the political 
processes, while business lobbies that are considered institutional groups have 
significant financial strength, without necessarily having a large number of 
members. An organization can have the characteristics of both categories. 
Even social-based groups can use some individuals who have economic and 
political strengths to overcome financial challenges and the collective action 
problem of the organization (Paul and Paul 2009:11-2).   
The main political activities of these interest groups can be 
summarized as influencing and mobilizing citizens, financing election 
campaigns, lobbying the legislative and executive branches through letters, 
visits and phone calls, going to court, and finally trying to convince 
international actors to exert pressure on states (Potters and Sloof 1995: 407). 
Helen Milner (1997: 23) emphasizes that in addition to exerting pressure on 
decision-makers, interest groups play another role, which is to provide them 
essential information in their respective areas of expertise.  
Our case study is primarily interested in two different kind of lobbies: 
the conservative Cuban-American lobby, which defends the status quo on the 
embargo, and the agribusiness lobby, represented mainly by the Chamber of 
Commerce and Farm Bureau-related groups, which try to affect the decision-
making processes in order to ease sanctions against Cuba. 
Apart from these groups, which represent the agribusiness and ethnic 
lobbies, other organized interests also try to influence the foreign policy 
decision-making process. Among many, we can mention foreign governments, 
companies, political parties and other foreign individuals, although these 
actors are not allowed to make contributions to electoral campaigns. Also, 
scholars, think-tanks, ideological groups, religious, environmental, labour and 
human rights organizations try to shape the ‘policy debates and legislators 
through technical reports, expert testimony and academic publications’ (Paul 
and Paul, 2009: 171-2). 
The literature identifies several features of interest groups and the 
determinants of their influence capacities (Dür and Bièvre, 2007: 3, Paul and 
Paul, 2009: 165; Rytz, 2013: 8, Holyoke, 2009: 371; Potters and Sloof 1995: 
433; Rubenzer and Redd, 2010: 770-2). Firstly, the influence of an interest 
group depends on the institutional structure of the government or state. In this 
sense, the American political system provides a large activity zone to these 
groups. Through campaign contributions and lobbying, they are able to change 
the behaviour of a legislator, especially if the proposed law is a technical one 
with reduced public visibility. That is why the existence of a Political Action 
Committee is essential for an organization that aims to influence the U.S. 
legislative process. Through PACs, the organizations basically raise money in 
order to spend them in favour or against a candidate or legislation. Then the 
strategy of ideological groups like the conservative Cuban-American lobby is 
oriented to support legislators, who already have a position close to the 
groups, while business groups like the Chamber of Commerce and agricultural 
lobby tend to change the position of legislators. Furthermore, the larger the 
organization of a group, the greater is its political influence. The high electoral 
mobilization of an ethnic minority and its concentration in a few electoral 
districts help overcome its numerical disadvantages and cultural 
dissimilarities. The presence of an ‘enemy’ and a historical trauma may also 
contribute to the mobilization of such ethnic communities. On the other hand, 
an electorate that is well informed on an issue reduces the influence of interest 
groups. Another important point is that the parallelism between the political 
goals of the group and the current government policy also contributes to a 
group’s success. In this sense, the group must adapt its discursive strategy to 
changes in the official foreign policy discourse. Finally, the presence of a 
second strong group that aims to influence the political process in the opposite 
direction reduces the influence of the first group, while a third ally group may 
serve to increase the influence of the first one. 
Despite the focus of the majority of scholars on the decision-making 
process to analyse the level of the lobbies’ influence, Mearsheimer and Walt 
(2009: 205) do not ignore their attempts to determine the dominant public 
discourse on the relevant issue—in their case, it is the Israeli lobby—through 
influencing the media, academia and think-tanks. Taking the example of the 
Israeli lobby and its exemplary organization: the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, the Cuban-American community intended to determine 
the public discourse on the Cuban issue in the United States. For instance, in 
the last decade of the 20th century, the Cuban American National Foundation 
organized a boycott of The Miami Herald that opposed the objectives of the 
Foundation. The CANF also created a fund to encourage Cuban studies at a 
public university—Florida International University. However, after a long 
battle, FIU refused to open the programme; it would later be opened within a 
private university—the University of Miami (Haney and Vanderbush 2005: 
45-6). 
Even if it could never attain the level of influence of AIPAC, CANF 
was able to determine the discourse in the United States towards Cuba for 
nearly two decades. However, their influence began to wane in the late 1990s. 
It was the end of the Cold War, which opened up more space for other interest 
groups and that facilitated the efforts against the traditional U.S. policy 
towards the island. Moreover, the U.S.-born Cuban-American generation and 
the new immigrants divided the community ideologically. In the media, 
academia, and think-tanks, they began to make their voices heard increasingly 
in favour of a change in the relations between the two countries. New NGOs 
from different tendencies, such as the Cuba Study Group, appeared and 
participated in the anti-embargo wave. Humanitarian and religious 
organizations also joined the agribusiness lobby, which was represented 
mainly by the Chamber of Commerce and Farm Bureau-related groups, in 
order to ease the embargo—if not to end it. 
The executive branch, the business groups and the media exert more 
influence than any ethnic group, according to a study conducted by Paul and 
Paul (2009: 203), in which the authors measure the perceived influence of the 
actors in the area of U.S. foreign policy. In the same study, the authors identify 
four patterns of organization for ethnic groups (2009: 53–68). The first is the 
AIPAC model that was followed by the CANF for about two decades. This 
model ‘consists of developing of separate funding, research and lobbying 
organizations.’ Although AIPAC does not contribute directly to the election 
campaigns of the candidates by organizing a Political Action Committee 
(PAC), CANF used the Free Cuba PAC in order to directly finance campaigns. 
The second form for the groups is to function mainly as a Political 
Action Committee, which means that the essential function of these groups is 
to contribute to candidate campaigns. Furthermore, they can also establish 
contacts with legislators and their staff. U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which 
represents the community’s conservative wing since 2003, can be considered 
to belong to this category. 
The not-for-profit 501(c)(3) advocacy model is the third pattern. The 
Cuba Study Group fits in this model. In many cases, individual contributions 
to these organizations are tax-deductible. Despite their advocacy activities, 
these organizations are prohibited from funding lobbying campaigns, and they 
also cannot work in election campaigns. They dedicate their resources more to 
education, and collecting and diffusing information parallel to the group’s 
mission. Besides, these groups serve as information providers for legislators. 
Such information may be important at the stage of the preparation of law 
proposals. Despite not having authorization for direct lobbying, which is the 
most effective method to communicate directly with legislators in order to 
influence the decision-making process, these groups regularly contact the 
members of Congress and their staff. However, groups can attend Capitol Hill 
only if the lobbying is not the main goal of the organizations and only if they 
do not spend money in order to influence the legislators. In contrast, business 
groups can finance the campaigns indirectly forming PACs and other types of 
527 organizations. The PACs may contribute up to $5,000 in each phase of 
elections for each candidate. In other words, a candidate can receive up to 
$5,000 in the primaries, another $5,000 in the first tour of the elections, and a 
final $5,000 in the second round from each PAC.  
The entrepreneurial model is the last pattern, wherein a limited number 
of individuals concentrates all functions in itself, such as fundraising, 
advocacy, public relations, contacting members of Congress and their staff. 
CubaNow, with its small elite structure, may be considered to belong to this 
category.  
Since the defeat of the CANF in the Elián González and TSRA cases in 
2000, no other organization could replace it in order to represent all—or 
most—of the Cuban-American community. This was not only because of their 
lack of organizational capacity, but also because of the impossibility of uniting 
the entire community due to its generational and ideological divisions. Despite 
the appearance of new moderate organizations that seek to influence the 
decision-making process towards a normalization of relations between the two 
countries, the Cuban-American conservative core in Congress continues to 
play a significant role in this process, with the advantage of having a PAC 
concentrating on the Cuban issue. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC 
contributed $214,000 in 2004, $569,624 in 2006, $767,500 in 2008, $471,000 
in 2010, $304,000 in 2012, and $264,500 in 2014 to federal candidates from 
both parties.5 These amounts show a significant drop in contributions of the 
conservative wing of the Cuban community since 2008. It should be added 
that even the contributions from pro-Israel PACs—the ethnic lobby with the 
highest contributions—represented less than 1% of the PAC universe in the 
2004 and 2006 election cycles (Paul and Paul 2009: 99). This means that the 
capacity to influence the decision-making process of the ethnic lobbies—
including the Cuban-American lobby—through campaign financing has 
considerable limitations. Moreover, the moderate organizations and the 
agribusiness lobby—though the latter does not have a focus on the Cuban 
issue—with the help of many legislators and a President sympathetic to the 
cause of lifting the embargo are able to counterbalance and somehow 
overcome the conservative Cuban American lobby. Besides, the foundation of 
a new Political Action Committee, called the New Cuba PAC, which is 
seeking to help the campaigns of candidates who oppose the sanctions, might 
have some effects on the composition of the future Congress. 
Finally, the pro-embargo lobby has also lost its base in academia and 
media. The critical voices on the new policy announced by President Obama 
on December 2014 were weak among the scholars in American universities. 
The media, too, played an important role in this process. The new Post-Cold 
War era, in which different opinions may be discussed more easily, had an 
impact on the media, which exerts considerable influence on American society 
and politics. The editorials published by The New York Times between 
October and December 2014 coincided with the announcement of the new 
policy and served as a preparation of American public opinion for the ‘Cuban 
thaw’.6 However, not all newspapers supported the Obama administration on 
the issue. The Miami Herald has retained its position of scepticism, while The 
Washington Post and El Nuevo Herald opposed the new pro-normalization 
                                                        
5 See the website of the Center for Responsive Politics: https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
6 See the editorials of the NYT which coincided with the new policy towards Cuba: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/15/opinion/editorial-cuba-new-
start.html?action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Mar
ginalia&pgtype=article 
policy of the Obama administration.7 
 
Capitalist Restoration in Cuba 
 
The passage from capitalism to socialism took nearly ten years following the 
revolution that took place on the island in 1959. Rodriguez (2013:26-7) 
explains the changing property relations as follows: 
 
The most important structural transformations in property ownership 
took place between 1959 and 1963. The Agrarian Reform Law 
approved in May 1959 changed the nature of Cuba’s economy. It gave 
about 40% of the arable land to the state and to small farmers. A 
second Agrarian Reform Law in 1963 eliminated capitalism in Cuban 
agriculture[…] 
The result of these changes in property ownership was that by the end 
of 1960, foreign trade, banking, and wholesale trade were 100% state-
owned, while construction and industry were each 85%, transportation 
was 80%, retail trade was 52%, and agriculture was 37% nationalized. 
By 1968, all of these branches were entirely state property, except for 
agriculture, which was about 70% state-owned. 
 
Despite some small-scale liberal reforms during the 1980s and 
especially during the Special Period in the early 1990s, the reforms that are 
taking place since Raul Castro ascended to power have an essential difference 
with their antecedents. During Fidel Castro’s leadership, all the liberalization 
incentives were reversible, limited and under strict control of the State, even if 
it is undeniable that those early reforms prepared the legal and social bases for 
future economic policies. In this sense, the large-scale reforms announced and 
applied by Raul Castro’s administration are considerably loosening the State’s 
role in the economy while provoking the emergence of a new class constituted 
by hundreds of thousands of people who will become potential opposition 
members of the government, with the aim of enlarging their property rights 
and increasing profits. In this paper, we define this process that started in 2006 
as the restoration of capitalism in Cuba, and we claim that this new Cuban 
economic policy is the main factor which makes the normalization of the 
relations between two countries possible. This is a case similar to the United 
States’ other normalization processes with, for instance, Vietnam and China, 
                                                        
7 See the editorials of the main journals after the President’s declaration on December 2014: 
- Miami Herald: http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article4585921.html;  
- NYT http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/opinion/a-new-beginning-with-cuba.html;  
- Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-administration-
extends-the-castro-regime-in-cuba-a-bailout-it-doesnt-deserve/2014/12/17/a25a15d4-860c-
11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html 
 
especially if the target country does not represent any considerable threat 
against the United States.8 
As Spadoni (2014: 169-70) describes: 
 
In November 2010, the government published the lineamientos, 
which is a comprehensive policy blueprint detailing Cuba’s plans for 
future economic changes that were to be placed for consideration 
before the Sixth Congress of the CP of Cuba in April 2011. Held in 
Havana on April 16-19, 2011, the Sixth Congress of the CP of Cuba 
approved 313 guidelines, paving the way for far-reaching reforms to 
Cuba’s system of economic management. The final document with all 
ratified proposals and a companion booklet with a summary of the 
changes from the draft version of november 2010 and the official 
reasons for those changes were published in may 2011 and widely 
distributed across the island. 
 
The restoration is much more evident and advanced in the agricultural 
sector. While the State is still the biggest land-owner on the island, with 
ownership of slightly over 6.1 million hectares of the nearly 11 million total 
hectares (Oficina Nacional de Estadistica, 2015a), the rate of State ownership 
of agricultural land—especially cultivated land—has increasingly been 
reduced. As Wong and Dominguez (2013: 282-3) point out, state-owned farm 
rates have dwindled from 75% in the 1992 to 20.7% in 2010, while the 
Cooperativas de Créditos y Servicios (CCSs) and private farmers’ shares have 
increased from 15% to 33% in the respective years. The rest of the cultivated 
lands belong to two other cooperative forms—Unidades Básicas de 
Producción Cooperativa (UBPCs) and Cooperativa de Producción 
Agropecuaria (CPAs). The authors adds as follows: 
 
In 2010, the 2,200 UBPCs farmed 37.5% of the agricultural 
surface area in Cuba. The entire nonstate agricultural sector –
consisting of UBPCs, the roughly four thousand preexisting 
cooperatives (Credit and Service Cooperatives CCSs and Agricultural 
Production Cooperatives CPAs) and an increased number of 
individual farmers –together accounted for 79,3 % of the total 
area[…] 
                                                        
8 The rapprochament between China and the U.S. became possible in the early 1970s due to 
the Sino-Soviet conflicts in various areas. However the normalization of the diplomatic 
relations occured in 1979 only one year after the economic reform program announced by the 
Communist Party of China. On the other hand, the normalization with Vietnam had to wait 
until the end of the Cold War due to its alliance with the USSR. In 1986, the 6th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to implement a liberal economic reform 
program and the two countries normalized their diplomatic relations during the Bill Clinton 
administration in 1995.   
The state is no longer the main actor at the micro-economic 
level, and economic laws play a more active role in the regulation of 
production[…]  
The Cuban government enacted Decree-Law 259 in mid-2008, 
which conveys idle farmland in usufruct to individuals or groups who 
commit to return it to production. By the end of 2010, 1 million 
hectares have been turned over for cultivation to 108,000 individuals 
and 2,000 cooperatives.  
 
 Besides agriculture, the structural reforms include many other sectors 
of the economy. Albeit not defining the new economic policy as a restoration, 
but as pragmatic, Mesa-Lago and Pérez-Lopéz (2013:23) resume those 
reforms as follows:  
 
de-collectivization; decentralization of decisionmaking; larger role for 
the budget and its relation with fiscal and monetary policies, with tax 
reform aimed at increasing government revenues; eradication of 
voluntary work and of construction brigades because of their 
inefficiency; gradual elimination of the rationing system and increased 
role of market prices in resource allocation; expansion of self-
employment to cover 181 occupations, permission for private 
transportation service providers –including taxis—to operate, and 
creation of cooperatives in production and services; permission for 
producers to sell their output directly at free agircultural markets; 
criticism of egalitarianism, virtual elimination of moral incentives, and 
predominance of material incentives; and reduction in social 
expenditures, wihch must be based on economic criteria and 
availability of fiscal resources. 
 
Estrada (2014: 27) concedes the risks of the decentralization for a 
socialist economy, referring to “a strengthened class of entrepreneurs with 
semi-absolute decision-making powers, which in decentralization in Eastern 
European ex-socialist models served as a catalyst for capitalist restoration.” 
 Finally, as Ritter (2014:124) notes, “the political and media 
stigmatization has been reversed.” The official negative discourse against the 
private property disappeared, and, in fact, it started to be incentivized. The 
Party’s official newspaper’s transmission (Granma 2016) of Raul Castro’s 
speech in the 7th Congress of the Communist Party is suggestive of how 
different the administration’s attitude towards private entrepreneurship is 
compared to Fidel Castro’s approach to it as a necessary evil. After 
underlining the importance of the increasing number of people working in the 
non-state sectors, the First Secretary of the Party, Raul Castro, adds that “the 
cooperatives, the medium and small businesses are neither anti-social, nor 
counter-revolutionary.” According to the ONE’s 2015 report on employment 
and wages in the previous year, the number of the workers employed in 
cooperatives and the private sector increased by more than 241,000 people 
since the announcement of the lineamientos by the Cuban administration in 
2011 (Oficina Nacional de Estadistica, 2015b). The government’s intention is 
to accelerate this trend. 
 In the light of these structural changes and by observing the tendency 
of Cuban economic indicators through the years, we assume that the process 
through which the island is passing should be named ‘the restoration of 
capitalism.’ Furthermore, we argue that the restoration is the main condition to 
normalize relations. The next section will analyse the interaction between the 
economic factors and the changing interest group politics, which is one of the 
domestic determinants of U.S. foreign policy along with the legislative and the 
executive branches. 
 
Interest Groups and Two Tactics on the Cuban Issue 
 
This study divides American interest groups active on the Cuban issue into 
two categories in accordance with their tactical policy preferences towards the 
island. The first tactic—used by the hardliners—is to impose economic 
sanctions and restrict diplomatic relations as much as possible until the 
conquest of the political power on the island by the opposition, which is going 
to return the confiscated properties to their ex-owners—leaders of the 
conservative Cuban-American lobby—and establish a liberal democratic 
system. On the other hand, a second tactic—adopted by the moderates—is 
lifting the sanctions, establishing normal diplomatic relations and increasing 
the contact between the two societies without demanding an immediate 
withdrawal of the Castros from power in order to create an internal 
environment that is going to provoke political change in the island. Not only 
the advocacy groups, but also other domestic actors of American politics, such 
as journals, think-tanks, members of the Congress and even the Presidents, 
come under one of these categories or take a position between these two. Apart 
from their differences, the components of these two categories share an 
ultimate objective: to create the best conditions for the superpower’s economic 
expansion. However, this common point does not diminish the importance of 
their methodological differences, which virtually shape U.S. foreign policy 
towards Cuba. 
 As mentioned in the previous sections, with the end of the Cold War, 
interest groups gained more space and started to influence American foreign 
policy decision-making process. Even if the Cuban American National 
Foundation became active during the Cold War period, its successful efforts in 
the 1980s were not a surprise, when the parallelism between the Reagan 
administration’s strategy towards the socialist countries and CANF’s political 
goals are considered. It should be added that in this period there was no sign 
from Havana to improve the relations and there was no particular interest by 
American companies to invest on the island due to the lack of opportunities. 
The main test for the Foundation that fits into the first category—until its 
division in the first years of the new century—began when the Communist 
threat ended in the beginning of the 1990s with the dissolution of the Socialist 
camp. However, the conservative CANF was still able to represent the Cuban-
American community and successfully lobbied for the passage of the 1992 and 
1996 laws that restricted the embargo. In the meantime, Cuba’s government—
which was confronting serious economic problems in the country due to its 
loss of its main economic partners—started to adopt liberal measures in order 
to surmount its economic difficulties. These reforms contained some serious 
modifications of Cuban law, with the aim of attracting foreign capital to the 
island, while opening up new opportunities for foreign companies, including 
the American business sector. It was in this context that the agribusiness lobby, 
which saw the possibility of the conquest of the Cuban market by its Canadian 
and European rivals, started to get interested in the Cuban economy.  
 The American Farm Bureau Federation and U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce-related groups started to create lobbying organizations in an 
alliance with several humanitarian and religious groups and the moderate wing 
of the Cuban-American community, which started to make its voice heard 
since the Elián González affair. For instance, the Cuba Study Group—which 
played an important role in the preparation of the policy change toward Cuba 
in 2014—explains briefly in its website when and why it was founded. 
 
The Group was formed in 2000 in the aftermath of the Elián González 
incident. Realizing that policies based on strategic rather than 
reflexive considerations were needed, the Group committed to seeking 
more practical, proactive, and consensual approaches toward Cuba 
policy.  
 
 After the George W. Bush administration, which was open to 
hardliners’ influence, the conservative Cuban-American community’s unique 
lobbying organization, U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, reduced its activities and 
expenditures with the arrival of Barack Obama, on whom it had no influence, 
whereas the moderates formed some influential lobbying organizations such as 
CubaNow, Engage Cuba Coalition, and New Cuba PAC during Obama’s 
presidency that coincided with the liberal reforms in Cuba. On the 
Congressional side, these two PACs in conflict focused their efforts on 
convincing mostly Republican representatives and Senators according to the 
share of their spending between members of the two parties in 2016.9 Taking 
into account the changing context, the conservative lobby’s reduced funds, and 
that its PAC contributed more to Democratic candidates in the 2008 and 2010 
                                                        
9 See the amount of the contributions of the New Cuba PAC to federal candidates:  
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00572628 ; and see the contributions 
of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00387720  
election cycles, we may conclude that it passed to the defensive side, seeking 
at least not to lose its Republican allies since the 2012 election cycle.  
Apart from these lobbying organizations, some other advocacy groups 
deserve to be mentioned, such as the Center For a Free Cuba, Cuban Liberty 
Council, Directorio Democrático Cubano and Madres y Mujeres Anti-
Represión in the first category; and Washington Office on Latin America, 
Center for Democracy in the Americas, and Cuba Study Group in the second 
one. The only organization of considerable significance that does not fit into 
this division is the Cuban American National Foundation because of its mixed 
policy positions between the two camps.10  
 In sum, since the turn of the century, the Cuban-American 
community’s members have been divided as their policy preferences have 
differed towards their country of origin. The hardliners started to get isolated 
in their efforts to retain the status quo towards Havana as the moderate wing of 
the community was strengthened as a consequence of this division, and the 
entry of the agribusiness groups into the scene, with their increasing lobbying 
efforts since the liberal economic reforms on the island. However, with the 
presence of a President sympathetic to their cause in office, the conservative 
lobby succeeded in resisting the pressures that came from the rest of the 
society during the George W. Bush administration. In the meantime, the 
arrival of Barack Obama, who had normalization of releations on his agenda 
with the support of the majority of the Americans for a new policy towards 
Cuba, created the worst conditions for the hardliners in Washington, D.C. 
since the beginning of their political activities in the United States. Taking into 
account the support of a vast majority of the Democratic Congressmen for the 
new policy, the main advantage for the hardliners is the Republican majority 
in both chambers of the Congress since the announcement of the new policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the dominance of the executive branch over the formulation of U.S. 
foreign policy toward Cuba until almost the end of the Cold War, the Cuban-
American lobby became the main domestic actor that was able to influence 
relations between the two countries due to its influence on both executive and 
legislative branches. On the other hand, the role of the conservative 
community and its contact with both branches have become much more 
complex since the end of the 20th century.  
Firstly, the Cuban-American community settled in the United States—
particularly in Miami—has been transformed not only demographically but 
also ideologically. In other words, the rate of growth of the population of 
Cuban origin in Miami stopped increasing in the 1990s for the first time since 
                                                        
10 See CANF’s declaration following the President Obama’s announcement reagarding the 
new U.S.-Cuba Policy: http://canf.org/news-item/canf-responds-to-todays-announcement-
regarding-u-s-cuba-policy/    
the revolution (Eckstein, 2009: 46). In addition, surveys carried out in the 
same period showed that the proportion of those Cuban-Americans who 
advocated a change in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba increased its weight 
significantly, particularly among the most recent immigrants and younger 
generations who were born in the United States (Sung-Chang and Grenier 
2004:1). Today, the Cuban-American community does not vote for the 
Republican Party as a block. In the 2012 presidential elections, around 50% of 
the electors of Cuban origin in Florida voted for Barack Obama who 
represented the liberal wing of the American business (Lopez and Taylor, 
2012).  
Secondly, various interest groups—other than the conservative ethnic 
one—have entered the scene. For instance, the agricultural lobby played a 
decisive role in the formulation and implementation of the Trade Sanction 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which authorized the sales of some 
agricultural and medical products to the island in 2000. At the same time, 
other sectors of American business also began lobbying to soften the embargo 
in order to increase the trade volume between Washington, D.C. and Havana. 
These agribusiness groups’ activities increased with the Cuban economic 
reforms, which were initiated following the transfer of power from Fidel 
Castro to Raul Castro.  
In addition to these determinants related to American interest group 
politics, some international factors deserve to be mentioned, such as the 
reducing influence of Venezuela in Cuba owing to the economic and political 
difficulties that this country is trying to overcome, improved relations between 
Havana and the Vatican, the isolation of the United States in the Hemispheric 
Summits, and the role of Canada and the European Union. All of these 
determinants helped to create the appropriate international environment, and 
the necessary pressure on the U.S. and Cuban governments to improve their 
relations. 
Shortly, the success of the hardliners depend now largely on the 
Republican strength in the White House and Congress as they lost their 
capacity of influence on the Democrats, and in this sense, the victory of the 
Republican Donald Trump could be a last opportunity to implement their 
agenda. Although the newly elected Republican President Donald Trump has 
given the signals of being tougher on the Cuban issue such as the appointment 
of the hardliner Mauricio Claver-Carone to his transition team, the new 
direction of the relations between Cuba and the U.S. drawn by Obama 
administration is getting built on a solid base. The irreversible liberal reforms 
on the island guarantee the need to normalize relations while creating 
opportunities for American businesses and providing the necessary resources 
for the new Cuban economy. Even with a Republican majority in the Congress 
and a Republican administration in the White House, it would be difficult to 
turn back permanently to the old Cold War policy toward the island. Today, 
there are sufficient conditions to expect a full normalization of the relations 
between the two countries in a near future. 
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